City Hall (photo: Rob Bennett, Mayor’s Office)
By Stephen Louis
On December 31, 2025, Mayor Eric Adams, on his last day in office, appointed a new Charter Revision Commission (CRC), a body that reviews the New York City Charter and recommends changes to the voters. The press release announcing the creation of the CRC said it would especially focus on whether open primaries and non-partisan elections would make city government more inclusive, accessible, and democratic.
It is unprecedented for a mayor to appoint a CRC that could not even meet, let alone issue a report, during the term of the mayor that appointed it. The closest precedent was when Mayor Bill de Blasio appointed a CRC (also known as the Racial Justice Commission) in March 2021. While the ballot questions it submitted were not on the ballot until November 2022, after Mayor de Blasio had left office, that CRC made sure to issue its report in December 2021, during Mayor de Blasio’s final week in office.
I. Municipal Home Rule and Charter Revision
The creation of this CRC seems to be permitted under the relevant provisions of section 36 of the state’s Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL), which governs the creation and operation of CRCs. However, several provisions of that law were almost certainly not drafted with this particular scenario in mind, so several issues of implementation will arise — assuming this CRC moves forward with its mission (as described below it could essentially dissolve itself).
Much attention has been paid over the years to issues regarding “bumping” — the provision of section 36 that assures that a “mayoral” CRC (one appointed by the Mayor) is able to present its charter reform questions to the electorate without the distraction of other local referenda. Before discussing the implications of that provision of the MHRL, it is important to further examine its provisions — in subdivisions 4, and select paragraphs of subdivisions 5 and 6 — relating to the creation and operations of a CRC, and how they would apply to the CRC Adams created on his final day in office, as well as the relevant options in front of the new Mayor, Zohran Mamdani.
The MHRL provides the state’s procedural framework for local governance, both empowering and limiting municipalities. In particular, it sets forth how localities can adopt local laws. New York City, like all counties, cities, towns, and villages in New York State, is subject to these provisions. In particular, sections 36 and 37 set forth how cities, including New York City, can provide for revisions to their charters by referendum, including via creation of CRCs. (See more below in Section VI: More on Local Laws, Amending the City Charter, and Charter Revision Commission)
There are several relevant provisions of MHRL section 36 that inform the current CRC situation and what Mayor Mamdani may do about it. They are excerpted below this article for reference, with particularly relevant portions in bold. (See below in Section V: Highlighted Excerpts of New York State Municipal Home Rule Law Section 36)
II. Questions and Answers About Municipal Home Rule Law and the Charter Revision Commission:
Can Mayor Mamdani revoke, withdraw, or otherwise cancel the creation of the CRC?
No, the CRC, once established, remains in place until the earlier of 1) it issues a report and its questions have been voted on by the electorate or 2) the conduct of the second general election after its appointment. There is no current provision in law to allow for ending a CRC in existence.
Can Mayor Mamdani remove and/or replace individual members of the commission?
In certain circumstances, yes. The law allows for 15 commission members. Mayor Adams appointed 15 to the CRC. If one or more were to resign, Mayor Mamdani could replace them, to fill any vacancy. If one or more of them committed acts that could result in removal for cause, such a criminal or corrupt behavior, or chronic absence, he could remove them, and again, fill any vacancy. As an alternative, the Mayor could decide not to replace members that either leave on their own or are removed by him. In that case, if the total number of members falls below nine, it can no longer function as a CRC.
There is a somewhat open question as to whether the Mayor could remove members even without cause. I believe the answer is no, because they are public officers, have been appointed for terms (as noted above, they remain “in office” until a question is presented or two general elections have passed) and allowing removal would lessen their independence as a commission. Unless removal is specifically authorized in law, public officers appointed for terms can only be removed for cause.
Others may argue that the “term” referenced in the law is not really a “term” as typically used for certain officials, but merely a mechanism to ensure the CRC does not exist indefinitely. Under that reasoning, removal, not being explicitly prohibited in Municipal Home Rule Law section 36, is permitted. If the Mayor sought to remove the members under this theory, presumably they would challenge that action.
Must Mayor Mamdani provide funding for the CRC, and otherwise cooperate with its activities?
This is not clear. The likely answer is that the City must provide some minimal resources, even if it falls well short of what other CRCs typically receive, or what the new CRC requests. The City, through its normal budgeting process, and the Mayor, through an alternative special process, are permitted, but not required, to provide resources, and are permitted, but not required, to authorize city agencies to cooperate with the CRC.
Over the years, CRCs have been funded at the discretion of either the City Council or the Mayor. While these decisions to fund seem to have been made voluntarily, there are certain provisions in section 36 that imply some mandate to fund the CRC. For example members “shall” be reimbursed for expenses, the CRC “shall” appoint employees, and “shall” conduct public hearings. These provisions do not imply the CRC should receive blank checks, but perhaps indicate that it is entitled to some level of funding to carry out these statutory requirements. However, the Mayor is free to prioritize some city functions over others, and may keep funding to a bare minimum.
Must Mayor Mamdani commit resources to permit the CRC to publicize its activities, and in particular advertise its proposals?
Again, there is probably some minimal level of effort required, but not a substantial one. As above, the CRC “shall” provide for publicity, implying some level of funding may be mandated. Thus far, the only work that appears to have been done is the creation of a webpage within the city’s official nyc.gov website.
In the absence of City funding, may the CRC accept private funding?
Probably yes, with some caveats. The CRC “may accept any services, facilities or funds … for its purposes.” Provided contributions from the private sector do not come with some explicit or implicit quid pro quo, which would raise conflict of interest issues, they may be accepted. However, city agencies (and for these purposes, a CRC is essentially a city agency) do not simply take private funds to freely spend on their own. Typically these funds are channeled through a process that includes the City’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), with expenditures subject to City processes and potential Comptroller review. This could create a stumbling block for private resources to be made available in a timely fashion.
III. Competing CRCs and Bumping Provision
Municipal Home Rule Law subdivision 5, partially referenced above with respect to CRC publicity efforts, also includes the following provisions related to multiple CRCs, ballot questions, and what is commonly known as the “bumping” provision:
(d) If any question submitted by the charter commission receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified electors of the city voting thereon, the proposal submitted thereby shall take effect as specified therein and the new charter or the amendment or amendments to the existing charter as so proposed shall become operative as prescribed therein; except that if there be a conflict between the provisions of two or more proposals approved by the electors at the same election, the proposal receiving the largest number of affirmative votes shall prevail to the extent of such conflict
(e) At any election at which any question or questions shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the city by a charter commission pursuant to this section or within sixty days thereafter, no other question or questions shall be submitted to or voted upon by such electors pursuant to any local law, ordinance, resolution or petition if such commission was created pursuant to subdivision four of this section, and no such other question or questions shall be submitted except by another charter commission if such commission was created otherwise, if such other question or questions involve or relate directly or indirectly to the adoption of a new city charter, the amendment of a city charter, charter revision, the establishment of a commission to draft a new or revised city charter, or the functions, powers or duties of any elective officer of the city, except as provided in paragraph (g) of this subdivision.
Could the mayoral CRC put proposals on the ballot that “bump” those that could be put forth by an existing CRC — one that was created by the City Council and must present its proposals for no later than the 2026 general election?
Yes, if the CRC put items on the ballot this year, they would bump the Council CRC proposals. The thrust of the provision cited above is that if the Mayor has created a CRC (in other words, a CRC created pursuant to subdivision 4), all other local ballot questions, including those from otherwise-created CRCs, would be bumped and not voted on.
Could Mayor Mamdani appoint another CRC?
There is nothing explicit in the law that prevents the Mayor from appointing another CRC. Again, this would be unprecedented and was certainly not contemplated in the law. Presumably this CRC would be better funded than the existing one and thus be better able to get its message out. A CRC created by Mayor Mamdani this year would have the same “expiration date” as the one created by Mayor Adams – the 2027 general election. Either one could propose questions in 2026, only to have the other one wait and propose questions to undo those proposed revisions (assuming they passed) or make other changes in 2027.
How would the “bumping” provision work if both put questions on the ballot the same year?
This is not entirely clear. Presumably they are both potential beneficiaries of the bumping provision. I think the better reading of subdivision 5 (e) is that whichever one submits its questions first gets on the ballot, and the other one has to wait. But an argument can be made that the provision did not intend for one mayoral CRC to bump another, and thus both would appear on the ballot in the same year. If so, under subdivision 5 (d), if any questions of the two CRCs were in conflict, and both passed, whichever one received the most votes would prevail. Of course, there could be issues with certain provisions as to whether they actually conflict, or could be read together and harmonized.
IV. Possible Response to the Adams Commission
As noted above, it is unprecedented having a CRC appointed by a prior administration able to make new proposals during the term of a new administration, and thus there are no precedents as to how to respond.
One approach for the new administration is to simply wait and see what, if anything, the CRC does, let the process play out, and if there is anything problematic about its proposals, engage in opposing them. While the City government should not spend money to directly urge a no vote on referenda, the administration can presumably find private contributors for a negative campaign.
Another approach is to urge members of the CRC to step down, or to simply not meet. As noted above, it could try to limit the resources made available to the CRC, so it cannot conduct a robust process.
While there may be ways to so neutralize the CRC that it cannot engage fully in its mission, a more direct approach would be to convince the State Legislature and Governor to narrowly amend section 36 of the Municipal Home Rule Law to prevent this CRC, or those similarly situated, from going forward.
One such proposal has already been introduced by State Senator John Liu, bill S8934, which would require the incoming Mayor to confirm that a CRC appointed in the waning days of the prior administration should continue. Failure to so confirm would cause the CRC to automatically expire. Senator Liu’s proposal would be retroactive to apply to the current CRC. A law such as this would avoid the difficult statutory interpretation issues raised above. (It would also avoid the more controversial issue of “bumping” – in 2025, after years of consideration of the issue, the State Legislature passed a bill (A3665) to eliminate the “bumping” provision but that bill was vetoed by Governor Hochul.) If this is the path forward, best for it to be taken soon, before Mayor Adams’ CRC does substantive work. Otherwise it will appear to be more about blocking specific proposals than correcting bad process.
Whether requested by the Mamdani administration, as suggested above, or on their own initiative, the Adams CRC members could resign, or they could take a more passive approach, and simply remain in place but not take any action, until their term expires in November 2027. While there is no mechanism for a CRC to formally disband, the members, or at least enough of them to deny the CRC enough members to proceed, could submit resignation letters. Assuming seven members resigned, leaving the CRC with only eight members, it would not be properly constituted, and could not take further action.
V. Highlighted Excerpts of New York State Municipal Home Rule Law Section 36
4. A charter commission to draft a new or revised city charter may also be created by the mayor of any city. Such commission shall consist of not less than nine nor more than fifteen members, all of whom shall be residents of the city. Original appointments to such a commission shall be made by the mayor by a certificate of appointment which shall specify the number of, and names of, the members to constitute the commission, which certificate shall be filed forthwith with the city clerk. The chairman, vice-chairman and secretary shall be appointed by the mayor from among the members of the commission. Any vacancy in the membership of such a commission or of its officers shall be filled by the mayor.
5….(b) Such new charter or amendments shall be completed and filed in the office of the city clerk in time for submission to the electors not later than the second general election after the charter commission is created and organized. The local law or certificate establishing the commission or, in the absence of such provision therein, the charter commission shall provide for such publication or other publicity in respect to the provisions of the proposed charter or amendments as it may deem proper, and for submission thereof to the electors of the city at a general or special election held not earlier than sixty days after the filing thereof in the office of the city clerk and not later than the next general election which does not occur within the said sixty days, provided, however, that if such general election occurs within ninety days after the said filing, the proposed charter or amendments shall be submitted at such general election.
6. Any charter commission created under this section shall also be subject to the following provisions
(a) Members of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services, but shall be reimbursed for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties.
(b) The commission shall appoint and may at pleasure remove such employees and consultants as it shall require and fix their compensation and may accept any services, facilities or funds and use or expend the same for its purposes. On request of the commission, the mayor or, in a city having a city manager, the city manager may direct any board, body, officer or employee of the city to cooperate with, assist, advise, provide facilities, materials or data and render services to the commission
(c) In addition to action under any other power to make appropriations for the support of a charter commission, the appropriate officials of the city shall have power, on request of the commission, to appropriate to such commission such sum or sums as shall be necessary to defray its expenses and, in the event the appropriating body or bodies do not take affirmative action to provide such sum or sums within forty-five days of the commission’s request, the mayor of the city shall have power to authorize, by certificate filed with the fiscal officer or officers of the city, the commission to incur liabilities and expenses as specified by him, but within the sum or sums so requested, which shall be a charge against the city and which shall be audited and paid by the appropriate officials of the city..
(e) The terms of office of the members of the commission shall expire on the day of the election at which the proposed new charter or charter amendments prepared by the commission are submitted to the qualified electors of the city, or on the day of the second general election following the organization of the commission if no such questions have been submitted by that time.
(f) The commission shall conduct public hearings. It shall conduct such public hearings at such times and at such places within the city as it shall deem necessary. The commission shall also have power to conduct private hearings, take testimony, subpoena witnesses and require the production of books, papers and records.
VI. More on Local Laws, Amending the City Charter, and Charter Revision Commission
As noted, the MHRL both empowers and limits local governments with respect to local laws, including charter amendments. There are a number of mechanisms available. Charters can be amended by local law enacted by the local legislative body, with one large caveat to be noted. Charters can also be amended by state statute, although a home rule message from the locality may be necessary to employ that route. There may also be a voter-initiated petition for referendum, governed by MHRL section 37 and New York City Charter section 40. Finally, the charter may be amended by a CRC, created by the Mayor, the City Council, the State, or by voter petition.
The caveat – one clear limitation on the power of the local legislative body to amend the charter – is the list of “mandatory referendum” matters. These are changes deemed so significant and so “political” in nature – relating more to the balance of power of respective officials rather than substantive policy – that they are not left to the legislative body to decide. The voters must approve them before taking effect. To be clear, local legislative bodies can adopt such local laws, but must then submit them to the voters. In New York City, that has on occasion happened, but usually the need for a referendum is enough to stop such a local law from enactment. It is generally left to a CRC to consider such proposals and then place them on the ballot.
MHRL section 23 includes a list of those items (New York City Charter section 38 has a similar list). Chief among them:
-Changing the membership or composition of the local legislative body.
-Changing the veto power of the chief executive officer.
-Abolishing an elective office or changing the method of electing or removing an elective officer, or changing the term of an elective office or reducing the salary of an elective officer during their term of office.
-Abolishing, transferring or curtailing any power of an elective officer.
-Creating a new elective officer.
While CRCs can amend portions of the charter that are not subject to referendum, naturally their focus tends to be in those areas that require a referendum.
*****
Stephen Louis is Distinguished Fellow and Counsel for the Center for New York City and State Law at New York Law School.